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Bundling Strategy in Base-Supplemental Goods Markets:
The Case of Microsoft
Sang-Yong Tom Lee
National University of Singapore
3 Science Drive 2, Singapore 117543
Abstract - We show that bundling is the optimal pricing
strategy for a base good monopolist who also supplies a
supplemental good under zero marginal cost of production.
Without the exit of the rival firm, bundling is a profitable
strategy because it increases the profits in the base good
market. We show that bundling lowers social welfare as
well as rival firms’ profit if the supplemental goods are
close substitutes. Otherwise, bundling may actually
generate welfare enhancements. Our analysis applies
directly to the computer software markets and the case of
Microsoft.
1. Introduction
We define a ‘base good’ as one of two complimentary goods
which must be purchased and installed prior to consume the
supplemental goods, where a ‘supplemental good’ provides
consumption benefit when only used in conjunction with the
base good. A base good may give consumption benefit without
supplemental goods but supplemental goods always require a
base good. Markets that fit this base-supplemental goods
description include: hardware – software, operating system application software, and local phone- long distance service.
We narrow our focus in the current paper and consider the
situation in which the base good market is monopolized and the
supplemental goods are provided by two firms, one of which
may be the base good monopolist. We assume that consumers
have unit demands; i.e., they wish to purchase only one of the
supplemental goods. For example, in the personal computer
(PC) industry, the operating system (OS) is a base good, and
application software programs are the supplemental goods.
Microsoft monopolizes the PC operating system market, and
competes with other firms in various application software
markets; e.g., MS Word versus WordPerfect, Excel versus
Lotus 1-2-3, and Internet Explorer versus Netscape Navigator.
In October 1997, the United States Department of
Justice(DOJ) filed a lawsuit against Microsoft for violating an
earlier consent decree which prohibited (among other things)
bundling the Internet Explorer (IE) with the Windows operating
system. The DOJ claims that bundling Internet Explorer with
Windows is an anti-competitive move designed purely to drive
Netscape out of the web browser business. The DOJ would like
to force Microsoft to either remove its web browser from the
Windows system or include a copy of Netscape Navigator with
each sale of Windows 95.1 Meanwhile, Microsoft claims that

the consent decree allows them to integrate IE with Windows 95
since it benefits the consumers by giving them more choices at
a lower price.2 Microsoft also argues that IE is an integrated
part of its Windows system since Windows will not boot without
IE.3
The DOJ’s condemnation is based on the ‘leverage theory’,
which says that bundling provides a mechanism whereby a firm
with monopoly power in one market can use the leverage to
monopolize a second market. However, the Chicago school has
criticized ‘leverage theory’and argued that the main motivation
for bundling is price discrimination. Furthermore, they have
argued that bundling could be socially beneficial, or at worst
ambiguous behavior.4
It is Whinston (1990) who revives the leverage theory of
bundling. He shows that in the presence of scale economies and
strategic interaction in the bundled good market, bundling can
be a profitable strategy by driving bundled good market rivals
out of the market. Whinston’s model requires the exit of the
rival firm for the profitability of bundling strategy. As Choi
(1996) correctly points out, if competitor has already paid the
sunk cost of entry and there is no avoidable fixed cost, bundling
cannot be a profitable strategy. To overcome this problem, Choi
considers the long run effects of R&D on competition.
Consequently, his model results in foreclosures in the
innovation market instead of the bundled good market.
The critical difference between the Chicago school literatures
and recent leverage theory literatures comes from the market
structure of the second market. Chicago school literatures
assume that the second market is perfectly competitive, while
Whinston (1990) assumes that the second market is not. We
consider a duopoly supplemental good market, which is similar
to Whinston. However, we find that without the exit of the rival
firm, bundling strategy is profitable.
Not be Found in Civil Contempt,” Antitrust Case Filings, 20
October, 1997 (http://www.usdoj.gov/art).
2

Bill Gates, “US v. Microsoft: We’re defending our right to
innovate,” Wall Street Journal, 20 May, 1998.
3

Microsoft Corporation, “Memorandum of Microsoft
Corporation in advance of the October 27, 1997 scheduling
conference before the court,” Microsoft Press Pass, 27 October,
1997 (http://www.microsoft.com/presspass).
4

See Whinston (1990) for the summary of Chicago school’s
Department of Justice, “Petition by the United States to argument.
Show Cause Why Respondent Microsoft Corporation Should
1
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Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1998) show that bundling very large
numbers of goods can be profitable if marginal production costs
for goods are zero. The reason is that the law of large numbers
makes it much easier to predict consumers’ valuations for a
bundle of goods than their valuations for the individual goods
when sold separately, and as a consequence, the seller can
extract higher consumer surplus. However, their basic setup is
different from other literatures and ours because their single
seller model has no consideration of competition, while we
analyze the monopolist incentivesof bundling of second good in
which market has serious competition.
Through base-supplemental relation, we analyze the
incentives for a base-good monopolist to bundle a supplemental
good with its platform, and determine the conditions under
which this is an optimal strategy. We show that bundling a
supplemental good with a base good is a profitable strategy for
the base good monopolist, even without the exit of a
supplemental good rival and without foreclosure of the
supplemental good market. This is our difference from other
leverage theory literatures. A bundling strategy increases the
profit in the monopolized base good market.
The next question we analyze is the welfare implications.
Specifically, is welfare lower (DOJ’ belief) or higher
(Microsoft’s claim)? We find that the welfare effect of a
bundling strategy depends on the degree of substitutability
between the two competing supplemental goods. If two goods
are close substitutes, then it decreases social welfare.
Otherwise, a bundling behavior may increase social welfare.
This paper is organized as follows. We describe the basic
setting of our model in section 2. Section 3 analyzes the
equilibrium prices and profits under three possible ownership
structures. Section 4 explains whether or not firms have an
incentive to merge and finds the equilibrium ownership
structure. Section 5 examines the welfare implication of firms’
mergers and pricing strategies. Section 6 provides a summary
and conclusion.
2. Basic Model
There are three firms in this model: one firm (firm Bm)
monopolizes the base good market and two firms (firm 1 and
firm 2) produce supplemental goods (S1 and S2, respectively).
The marginal cost of producing a base good or a supplemental
good is zero. As we will explain later, the zero marginal cost of
a supplemental good is the critical assumption for our analysis.
All fixed costs are sunk.
The tastes of consumers for the supplemental goods are
uniformly distributed along the unit interval and the population
is normalized to one. The locations of two supplemental good
firms are fixed: firm 1 is located at x=0 (left-end point) and firm
2 is located at x=1 (right-end point). A consumer incurs ‘utility
loss’ which is proportional to the difference between the
supplemental good and her taste.5
5

‘Utility loss’in this mode l is similar to ‘transportation cost’
in linear city model (see Tirole(1988) Section 7.1).

When a consumer located at x purchases S1, her net benefit
from consumption is
V = u(B, S1) - pS1 - tx - pB
(1)
u(0, Si ) = 0 , and u(1, Si ) > 0
where u(B, S1) = u(B,S2) is the utility from the supplemental
good, u(B, 0) is the stand-alone benefit of the base good B, pSi is
the price of supplemental good Si , pB is the price of the base
good, and t is the degree of utility loss which represents the
degree of differentiation between thesupplemental goods. For
simplicity, we assume that u(B,0)=0, which prevents a
consumer from buying only a base good without purchasing a
supplemental good in equilibrium. Finally, we assume that
consumers have unit demand so each consumer either purchases
zero or one unit of the good.
The supplemental goods are differentiated more for the
consumers when t is higher. As t increases, both supplemental
good firms have more monopoly powers. On the other hand, if
t = 0, the two goods are identical, whichresults in the Bertrand
competition with homogeneous goods.
A consumer located at x will buy S1 if
u(B, S1) - pS1 - tx - pB > u(B, S2) - pS2 - t(1-x) - pB and
u(B, S1) -pS1 - tx - pB > 0
Similarly, she will buy S2 if
u(B, S2) - pS2 - t(1-x) - pB > u(B, S1) - pS1 - tx - pB
u(B, S2) - pS2 - t(1-x) - pB > 0

and

Finally, she won’t buy anything if
u(B, S1) - pS1 - tx - pB < 0 and
u(B, S2) - pS2 - t(1-x) - pB < 0
The game consists of three stages. In the first stage, the
ownership structure is determined; the monopolist decides
whether or not to merge with one or both of supplemental good
firms. We assume that there is a transaction cost to change the
ownership structure. In the second stage, the monopolist sets
the prices of its products, and consumers purchase and install
the base goods. In the third stage, the remaining supplemental
good firm(s) sets the price of the supplemental goods and
consumers purchase them.
After the first stage, the ownership structure will be one of the
following: 1) independent ownership, 2) partial integration, and
3) full integration.
Under independent ownership, the
monopolist sets pB in the second stage and supplemental good
firms set pS1 and pS2 in the third stage. Under partial integration
or full integration, the monopolist not only sets the price of the
base good but also sets the price of the integrated supplemental
good firm’s product simultaneously. This gives a Stackelberg
leader’s advantage to the integrated firm.
Since the equilibrium outcome can be derived by backward
induction, we first analyze the equilibrium prices and profits
under three different ownership structures.
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3. Three Ownership Structures
3.1. Independent Ownership
To figure out the equilibrium outcome under independent
ownership, we need to distinguish between the uncovered and
covered markets. In other words, some consumers choose not to
purchase goods in equilibrium under certain circumstances.
Intuitively, one may think that the market is likely to be
uncovered when u(B, Si ) is small or the utility loss t is large.
Whether the market is covered or not is also affected by the
firms’ pricing strategy. The higher the price, the more likely it
is to be uncovered. We start with theuncovered market case.
Since the market structure of two supplemental goods is
symmetric under independent ownership, we consider only the
demand for S1 and the consumers located between zero and 1/2
when the market is uncovered. The demand function forS1 and
base good can be derived from the marginal consumer who is
indifferent between purchasing both B and S1 and not buying
anything. Therefore, from the marginal consumer’s net benefit
function u(B, S1) - pS1 - tx -pB = 0, the demand for the two
complementary goods B and S1 can be derived as
x(pB, pS1) = (1/t) (u - pS1 - pB )

(2)6

- tx -pB = u(B,S2) - pS2 - t(1-x) - pB. Therefore, the demand
function is x(pS1, pS2) = (t - pS1 + pS2) / 2t. By simultaneously
solving the first order conditions of these two profit functions,
we get the equilibrium prices and profits of the supplemental
good firms. Once the supplemental goods’ prices are derived,
the base good price will be the price which makes the benefit of
consumption equal to zero for the marginal consumer.
However, this is not the optimal strategy for the monopolist.
The problem for the monopolist is that this demand function
excludes the base good price, so the monopolist is not able to act
as a Stackelberg leader.
As a Stackelberg leader, the monopolist can set the base good
price such that the marginal consumer is indifferent between
buying B and S1, buying B and S2, or buying nothing. Recall the
response function of a supplemental good firm ispi (pB)=(u - pB
) / 2. By substituting this into a consumer’s benefit function and
setting pB to make the benefit be zero for the consumer who is
located at x=1/2, we can get the optimal strategy of the
monopolist. Therefore, the optimal outcome in the covered
market case under independent ownership is as follows:.
pBC,I = u - t
pS1C,I = pS2C,I = t / 2
xC,I = 1 / 2
πB C,I = u - t
π1C,I =π 2C,I = t / 4

(4)

where u ≡ u(1,Si ), i=1,2. Note that the demand function for S1
is not affected by the price of S2.
The monopolist’s profit is πB (pB,pS1) = 2 pB x, and firm 1's
Superscript ‘C,I’ represents the covered market case under
profit is π1(pB,pS1) = p1 x. Since the monopolist is a independent ownership. From (3) and (4), we can conclude that
Stackelberg leader, we can calculate the equilibrium outcome the equilibrium outcome is (3) if t ≥ u / 2 and is (4) if t < u / 2
by substituting the response function of the supplemental firm under independent ownership.
into the monopolist’s profit function. The response function is
p1(pB) = (u - pB ) / 2, and the monopolist’s profit function is
3.2 Partial Integration
πB(pB,pS1(pB)) = pB (u - pB)/2. Therefore, we calculate the
equilibrium outcome as follows.
Now, we consider the case when the monopolist merges with
firm 1. Equivalently, this may be the situation where the
monopolist also provides one of the two supplemental products.
pBU,I = u / 2
This ownership structure is the current situation of Microsoft
pS1U,I = pS2U,I = u / 4
and Netscape in the OS and web browser market. In this case,
xU,I = u / (4t)
(3)
pS1 is simultaneously determined with pB in the second stage,
πBU,I = u2 / (4t)
U,I
U,I
2
while pS2 is still set in the third stage. Therefore, the integrated
π1 = π2 = u / (16t)
firm is now a Stackelberg leader while firm 2 is a Stackelberg
Superscript ‘U,I’stands for the uncovered market case under follower. For the partial integration, once again, we consider
independent ownership. For (3) to be an equilibrium, xU,I must the uncovered and covered market cases separately.
When the market is uncovered, the demand function for B and
be less than 1/2, and t must be larger than u / 2 . This implies a
S
is given as (2) and the demand forB and S2 is y(pB,pS2) = (1/t)
1
high degree of differentiation of the two supplemental goods.
Now, we need to find the optimal strategy of the firms when (u - pS2 - pB ), where y is the marginal consumer’s distance from
7
t < u / 2. In this situation the market is covered. If we consider the right end point. In the second stage, the integrated firm sets
the marginal consumer who is indifferent between purchasing pB and pS1 to maximize the joint profitπB,I = (pB + pS1) x(pB,pS1)
B and S1 and purchasing B and S2, then the consumer’s location + pB y(pB,pS2) and firm 2 sets pS2 to maximize the profitπ2 = pS2
x is given by equating the costs for S1 and S2, i.e., u(B,S1) - pS1 y(pB,pS2) in the third stage. The response function of firm 2 is
p2(pB)=(u - pB ) / 2 which allows us to calculate the optimal
outcome.
6
For this demand equation, we assume thatt > 0. Otherwise,
7
a marginal consumer does not exist.
In the independent ownership case,xU,I = yU,I.
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pBU,P = u / 2
pS1U,P = 0, pS2U,P = u / 4
xU,P = u / (2t), yU,P = u / (4t)
πB,1U,P = 3u2 / (8t)
π2U,P = u2 / (16t)

(5)

Superscript ‘U,P’ represents the uncovered market under
partial integration while subscript ‘B,1’ represents the
integrated firm. The condition for the uncovered market isxU,P
< 1- yU,P , which is 4 t > 3 u.
Now, suppose 4 t < 3 u, then the degree of differentiation of
the two supplemental goods is relatively small so that the market
is covered. The best strategy of the monopolist is to make the
marginal consumer indifferent betweenbuying B and S1, buying
B and S2, or buying nothing. We obtain the equilibrium
outcome by using firm 2's response functionp2(pB) = (u - pB) /
2 and the marginal consumer’s location constraint,
xC,P = 1- yC,P.
pBC,P = u - (2/3) t
pS1C,P = 0, pS2C,P = t /3
xC,P = 2 / 3, yC,P = 1 / 3
πB,1C,P = u - (2/3) t
π2C,P = t /9

(6)

Superscript ‘C,P’ represents the covered market under
partial integration. From (5) and (6), we can conclude that
under partial integration the equilibrium outcome is (5) if4t ≥
3u and (6) if 4t < 3u.
The most interesting result is that the optimal price of: S1 is
zero (pS1 = 0) regardless of the coveredness of the market. The
intuition why the integrated firm is better off by a zero price for
the supplemental good is as follows. If firm 1 sets pS1 = 0, then
firm 2 lowers pS2 because the two prices are strategic
complements in a covered market. This enables the monopolist
to charge a higher price forthe base good. The increase in profit
from the base good market exceeds the reduction in profit from
the supplemental good market. Therefore, when the market is
covered, the source of gain is from the base good market. In the
uncovered market, the integrated firm is still better off. More
consumers will purchase B and S1 because the total price has
fallen. Cournot called this the ‘elimination of double
marginalization’.
However, a zero price of the supplemental good cannot
guarantee the optimal outcome, due to the time inconsistency
problem. The integrated firm announces pS1 = 0 in the second
stage and sells S1 in the third stage. If consumers believe pS1=0,
then those who have purchased the base goods with price pBC,P
would buy either S1 or S2 in the third stage. Once the integrated
firm has sold the base good, however, it would be better off
selling S1 with positive price in the third stage. The optimal
renegotiation price is pS1 = t/3 when the market is covered and
pS1 = u/ 4 when the market is uncovered. In this case, some
portion of consumers who have already purchased the base

goods will not buy the supplemental goods.
One way to solve this problem is to sell S1 together with the
base good in the second stage. This is called a ‘bundling
strategy’. Therefore, we conclude that the optimal strategy of
the integrated firm under partial integration is a ‘bundling
strategy’. However, this result is not robust to a non-zero
marginal cost. If the marginal production cost of the
supplemental good is c and c>0, then pS1U,P = c and pS1C,P=c/2.
Since the zero price of the supplemental good is a necessary
condition for the bundling strategy, bundling can not be the
optimal strategy of the integrated firm under a non
-zero
marginal cost.
In the software industry, it is commonly believed that the
marginal production cost is zero. Therefore, if the supplemental
good is a software, we assert that the optimal strategy of the
integrated firm is to bundle a supplemental good with base
good.
Another interesting result is that the rival firm can still
capture a significant portion of market in spite of bundling.
When two supplemental goods are not close substitutes (when t
is large), this is not a surprising result, because switching from
S2 to S1 causes big utility loss to the consumers locating near the
right end point. However, even if two goods are very close
substitutes, so the value of t is very small, the rival firm still
obtains one-third of the market share. This is because the rival
supplemental good price is also close to zero when two goods
are close substitutes. The bundling strategy will not force the
rival firm to exit the market.9
Whinston (1990) and Choi (1996) argue that bundling is
profitable strategy because it drives the rival firm out ofthe
market. However, in our static model, it is still profitable even
without the exit of rival firm, because it increases profits in the
base good market.8 We can claim the following proposition.

<Proposition 1> When the marginal production cost
of a supplemental good is zero, ‘bundling’ the
supplemental good with the base good is the optimal
strategy of the integrated firm. The rival firm will not be
driven out of the market by a bundling strategy regardless
of the degree of differentiation of two supplemental goods.
However, a bundling strategy increases profits in the base
good market.
This proposition has three arguments. The first one is that the
integrated firm’s optimal strategy is bundling strategy, the
second one is that the rival firm retains significant market share
in spite of bundling strategy, and the third one is that the purpose
of the bundling strategy is to increase profit in the base good
8

One may insist that the integrated firm does not increase
profits in base good market but simply changes the timing of
collection of profits in the supplemental good. We show that the
integrated firm does increase profits in base good market in the
Appendix.
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market. The first two arguments do not need further proofs and
we need to show only the last one.
As we will show in the next proof,πB,1C,P is larger than πBC,I
+ π1C,I. If we consider the profits from the sales to consumers
who used S1 under independent ownership, i.e., x < 1/2, then the
integrated firm has smaller profit under partial integration than
independent ownership because (πB,1C.P)/2 = u/2- t/3 is smaller
than (πB C,I )/2 + π 1C,I = u/2 -t/4. The reason for πB,1C,P > πBC,I
+ π1C,I is, then, that the profits from the sales of the base good to
the consumers with S2 i.e, x>1/2 are increased under partial
integration. Therefore, we can say that the result of bundling
strategy is to increase the profit in the base good market
3.3 Full Integration
The final ownership structure we analyze is the case when all
firms are integrated. Here, the integrated firm sets pS1, pS2 , and
pB to maximize the joint profit in the second stage. If the market
is uncovered, the equilibrium outcome is as follows.
pBU,F = u / 2 - pS1U,F
pS1U,F = pS2U,F
xU,F = yU,F = u / (2t)
πB,1,2U,F = u2 / (2t)

(7)

Superscript ‘U,F’ represents the uncovered market with full
integration, and subscript ‘B,1,2' is the merger of all three firms.
The condition for the uncovered market is xU,F < 1 - yU,F ,
which implies t > u. If the utility loss is relatively small so that
t < u, then the equilibrium outcome is as follows.
pBC,F = u - pS1C,F -t/2
pS1C,F = pS2C,F
xC,F = yC,F = 1 / 2
πB,1,2C,F = u - t/2

(8)

To check whether firms have an incentive to merge, we must
compare the profits of firms under various ownership structures.
As we suggested in the previous section, the subgame outcome
depends on the relative magnitude of the utility loss and
consumption benefit of the goods. Therefore, we consider four
possible cases: (a) t < u/2, (b) u/2 ≤ t < (3/4) u, (c) (3/4) u ≤ t
< u, and (d) u ≤ t. The degree of differentiation between the two
supplemental goods is smallest in case (a) and largest in case
(d). Or, we can say that the closeness of substitutability between
the two supplemental goods is the highest in case (a) and the
lowest in case (d). In this section, we check the incentives for
merger.
We first assume that transaction costs are negligible. We
consider the case when t < u/2, so two supplemental goods are
very close substitutes. In this case, the market is covered
regardless of ownership structure. Suppose the initial
ownership structure is an independent ownership.
By
comparing the profit of the firms in 4( ) and (6), we can
determine if there is an incentive for partial integration. We
conclude that the monopolist will merge with firm 1 becauseπB
C,I
+ π1C,I < πB,1C,P (see Appendix for the proof of proposition 2).
We also find that firm 2 realizes a reduction in profit under
partial integration. Next, we compare the profit in (6) and (8) to
determine if firms are better off under full integration. We find
that the fully integrated firm’s profit in (8) is greater than the
sum of the profits in (6), so firms are better off under full
integration.
Note that the joint profit of the integrated firm is the same as
the sum of three independent firms’ profits. There is no reason
to change from independent ownership to full integration. The
equilibrium structure is full integration when transaction costs
are small. Under independent ownership, there is an incentive
for partial integration, and under partial integration there is an
incentive for full integration.10
A similar analysis applies to other cases. If the utility loss is
in the range u/2 ≤ t < (3/4) u, then the market is uncovered
under independent ownership yet covered under partial
integration or full integration. Therefore, (3), (6), and (8) are
compared. Like the previous case, we find that the monopolist
has an incentive to merge with firm 1 while firm 2 is hurt by this
partial merger. We also find an incentive for full integration.
Next, if (3/4) u ≤ t < u, then the market is covered only under

Superscript ‘C,F’ represents the covered market under full
integration.
From (7) and (8), we can say that under full integration the
equilibrium outcome is (7) if t ≥ u, and (8) if t < u. Note that
there is no unique solution for prices in this full integration case.
As long as prices satisfy the equations in (7) or (8), they can be
equilibrium prices. However, just like the partial integration
case, the integrated firm confronts a time inconsistency
problem. One familiar solution to this problem is to bundle the integration. When the market is covered, the horizontally
two supplemental goods with the base good. The price of the merged firm’s optimal strategy is to split the market half and
bundled package is u/2 and u - t/2 from (7) and (8) respectively. half, which is the same strategy before the merger. Clearly, there
is no incentive for horizontal integration.
4.
9

Equilibrium Ownership Structure 9

We don’t consider the horizontal mergers between two
supplemental good firms. It is easy to show that there is no
incentive for horizontal mergers in our model. When the market
is uncovered, two supplemental good prices are not
interdependent, and as a result there is no gain from horizontal

10

If we consider the division of integrated profit among the
original individual firms, then because of the negotiation power,
each supplemental good firm earns as much as the unintegrated
rival supplemental good firm’s profit under partial integration
(t/9) and the monopolist gets the residual surplus. However, the
division of profits of integrated firm is of little interest to us.
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full integration while uncovered under other structures. We
compare (3), (5), and (8). There is an incentive for the base
good monopolist and firm 1 to integrate. Note that firm 2's
profit is not affected by this merger contrary to the two previous
cases. Firms have higher profits under full integration than
under partial integration.
Finally, whenu ≤ t, so the differentiation of two supplemental
goods is very large, then the market remains uncovered under
any ownership structure. We compare (3), (5), and (7) and find
an incentive for a monopolist to merge one of the two
supplemental good firms. All firms are also better off under full
integration.
We can conclude with the following proposition.
<Proposition 2> When the transaction costs of mergers
are negligible, the equilibrium structure of ownership is
always full integration.
Proof: See Appendix
Now, let’s introduce positive transaction costs of mergers in
our model. The equilibrium ownership structure is determined
by the relative magnitude of transaction costs and gains from
integrations. For example, when t < u/2, so when the market is
covered, the gain of partial integration ist/12, while the gain of
full integration is t/18. If the transaction cost is smaller than
t/18, then full integration is an equilibrium. If the transaction
cost is between t/18 and t/12, then partial equilibrium is an
equilibrium. Finally, if the transaction cost is larger thant/12,
then any initial structure is the equilibrium.
For all other cases, the gain of partial integration is greater
than the gain of full integration with the exception of the case t
≥ u. When t ≥ u, the two gains are equal. Therefore, we propose
that the gain of partial integration is greater than or equal to the
gain of full integration (see the proof in Appendix).
<Proposition 2'> Since the profit gain of partial
integration is not smaller than that of full integration, the
equilibrium structure is partial integration if the cost is
smaller than the partial integration gain and larger than
the full integration gain. It the cost is smaller than the full
integration gain, then the full integration is the
equilibrium. If the cost is larger than the partial
integration gain, then the initial structure is the
equilibrium.
Proof: See Appendix

5. Welfare Analysis

y*

x*

∫ (u −

p s 1 − tx − p B ) dx +

0

∫ (u −

p s 2 − ty − p B ) dy

,

0

where x is the distance from the left end point, ysi the distance
from the right end point, and x* and y* represent the locations of
marginal consumers. Computed welfare for (3), (4), (5), (6),
(7), and (8) are as follows.
WFU,I = 7u2 / (16t)
WFC,I = u - t/4
WFU,P = 19u2 / (32t)
WFC,P = u - (5/18)t
WFU,F = 3u2 / (4t)
WFC,F = u - t/4

(3)’
(4)’
(5)’
(6)’
(7)’
(8)’

We consider the four different cases (as we did in the
previous section) to determine the welfare effect of integra
tion
and pricing strategy. For the welfare analysis, we assume that
the transaction costs are negligible for simplicity. First, we
concentrate on the welfare effect of partial integration. Under
partial integration, we have already showed that the integrated
firm’s optimal strategy is to bundle the supplemental good with
the base good.
For case (a), in the previous section, t< u/2, the integrated
firm charges a lower price for the bundled goods than under
independent ownership. So, the consumers whobuy B and S1
under independent ownership are better off. Although pS2 is
lower, because pB is higher, consumers who purchase B and S2
pay more. Besides the consumers who switch from S2 to S1
incur higher utility loss. The reduced profit of firm 2 is als
o
larger than the increased profit of the integrated firm. The
negative effects are unambiguously larger than the positive
effects, hence, a partial merger and bundling strategy reduce
welfare.
For case (b), u/2 ≤ t < (3/4) u, consumers with B and S1 are
better off while consumers with B and S2 pay more. The total
welfare effect which includes utility and profits cannot be
unambiguously determined. If the utility loss is relatively small
(t < 0.510 u), then we have welfare loss. Contrarily ift > 0.510
u, then partial integration and bundling strategy are welfare
enhancing.
Finally, for case (c) or (d),(3/4)u < t, the market is uncovered
in both cases. Consumers with B and S1 are better off due to a
lower total price while consumers with B and S2 are indifferent
because the bundling strategy does not affect firm 2. The
integration brings only the elimination of double
marginalization. So, the partial integration and bundling
strategy are always welfare enhancing. Therefore, we can
conclude as follows.

<Proposition 3> Partial integration and bundling
strategy reduce welfare when two supplemental goods are
Since welfare is consumer surplus plus profits, we need to close substitutes (t ≤ 0.510u).
If the degree of
compute consumer surplus for each case. Consumer surplus is differentiation of two goods is quite high, then partial
the summation of a consumer’s net benefit. Therefore, integration and bundling strategy have welfare enhancing
consumer surplus is
results (t > 0.510u).

search
Proof: See Appendix
Now, we check the welfare effect of full integration. For case
(a), full integration restores welfare to the level under
independent ownership. Therefore, society would be better off
by full integration in this case. For other cases, it is
straightforward to show that welfare under full integration is
greater than under partial integration. Firms’ total profits are
higher under full integration (recall that firm’s always have
incentives for full integration) and consumers with B and S2 are
better off by a lower joint price. Only some portion of
consumers with B and S1 who previously enjoyed the benefit of
partial integration are worse off.
The latter effect is
overwhelmed by the former effect. Besides, welfare under full
integration is the largest among three possible ownership
structures. The distortion of an economy may be the smallest
under full integration.
<Proposition 4> If the market is covered regardless of
ownership structure, then welfare under full integration is
equal to that of independent ownership. In all other cases,
full integration brings the highest social welfare among the
three ownership structures.
Proof: See Appendix
6. Conclusion
We have shown that to bundle a supplemental good with a
base good is the optimal pricing strategy of the base good
monopolist who also supplies supplemental goods. Without the
exit of rival supplemental good firm, the bundling is profitable
because it increases the profits in the basegood.
We have also shown that the bundling strategy reduces social
welfare as well as rival firm’s profit if the two supplemental
goods are close substitutes. The rival firm still retains a
significant market share even in this case. Therefore, contrary
to the DOJ’s argument, Microsoft (the base good monopolist)
does not become a supplemental good (web browser)
monopolist simply by bundling IE with Windows. Moreover, a
bundling strategy is not always harmful for society. When two
supplemental goods are not close substitutes, we have shown
that bundling strategy may increase welfare. The equilibrium
ownership structure depends on the transaction costs of mergers
and the initial structure.
Finally, we may carefully think about the political
implication. On the belief that Microsoft is leveraging its
monopoly power of OS market to other supplemental goods
markets, some people insist that the government should split
11
Microsoft into a base good firm and supplemental good firms.
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For example, the Silicon Valley Research Institute (SRI)
proposes dividing Microsoft into five different companie
s
calling them “Baby Softs”. This is analogous to the divestiture
of the telecommunication monopoly AT&T (The New York
Times, May 25, 1998).

This may increase social welfare if the divestiture is not too
costly. According to our model, however, the merger with the
remaining rival firm (Netscape) would increase social welfare
even higher.
As we mentioned earlier, the DOJ would like to force
Microsoft either to remove its web browser from Windows
packages or to include a browser made by rival Netscape. One
may think that removing Internet Explorer from Windows is the
easiest solution. However, this might not be the best solution.
Suppose the monopolist can commit to a supplemental good
price when it sells the base good. If the monopolist wants to
build its reputation over time, so the commitment is binding,
then it can attain the same profit as bundling strategy by
announcing pS1=0. To increase social welfare, ironically, the
government could set a price floor by removing the product
from the package. Contrarily, including the rival’s product in
the package might be a solution by itself, because this brings the
same welfare results as under full integration. The onlyproblem
is the division of profit, i.e., at what price the monopolist buys
the rival’s product, which is beyond the scope of this work.
REFERENCES
[1] Bakos, Y. and Brynjolfsson E., (1998): “Bundling
Information Goods: Pricing, Profits, and Efficiency,
”
memeo.
[2] Carlton, D. and Waldman, M., (1998): “The Strategic Use
of Tying to Preserve and Create Market Power in Evolving
Industries,” mimeo.
[3] Choi, J. (1996): “Preemptive R&D, Rent Dissipation, and
the Leverage Theory,” The QuarterlyJournal of
Economics, 114(4), 1153-1181.
[4] Choi, J. and S. Yi (1997): “Vertical Foreclosure with the
Choice of Input Specifications,” mimeo.
[5] Church, J. and N. Gandal (1997): “System Competition,
Vertical Merger and Foreclosure,” mimeo.
[6] Economides, N. and S. Salop (1992): “Competition and
Integration among Complements, and Network Market
Structure,” Journal of Industrial Economics, XL(1),
105-33.
[7] Economides, N. (1994): “The Incentive for Vertical
Integration,” Discussion Paper EC-94-05, Stern School of
Business, N.Y.U.
[8] _________(1997): “The Incentive for Non-price
discrimination by an Input Monopolist,” Center for
Economic Policy Research(CEPR) Publication No.486.
[9]
________(1998): “Raising Rival’s Costs in
Complementary Goods Markets: LECs Entering into Long
Distance and Microsoft Bundling Internet Explorer,”
forthcoming in the Annual PRC 1997 Volume.
[10] Frazer, Tim (1988): Monopoly, Competition and the Law,
St. Martin’s Press, New York.
[11] Fisher, F.M., J. McGowan and J. Greenwook (1983):
Folded, Spindled, and Multilated: Economic Analysis
and U.S. v. IBM, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
[12] Lee, S. (1998) : “Vertical Merger and Compatibility in

search
Base-Supplemental Goods Industries,” mimeo.
[13] Ordover, J. G. Saloner, and S. Salop (1990): “Equilibrium
Vertical Foreclosure,” American Economic Review,
80(1), 127-42.
[14] Tirole, J. (1988): The theory of Industrial Organization,
The MIT press, Cambridge.
[15] Whinston, M.D., (1990): “Tying, Foreclosure, and
Exclusion,” American Economic Review, 80, 837-859

for this case. Therefore, the proposition holds for this range of
utility loss. For case(c), the gain of partial integration is
u2/(16t), while the gain of full integration isu - t/2 - 7u2/(16t).
The former is always larger than the latter because the
difference of the two is(t-u)2/2 Therefore, the proposition holds
for this range of utility loss. For case(d), both the gain of partial
integration and the gain of full integration areu2/(16t). From
(a), (b), (c), and (d), we conclude that the profit gain of partial
integration is larger than or equal to the profit gain of full
integration. <Q.E.D.>

Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof of Proposition 2
We need to show i) πB I + π1I < πB,1P and ii) πB,1P + π2P <
πB,1,2F for all four cases of utility loss. Case (a), t < u/2. i)πB C,I
+ π1C,I = u-(3/4)t is smaller than πB,1C,P = u-(2/3)t and ii) πB,1C,P
+ π2C,P = u-(5/9)t is also smaller than πB,1,2C,F = u-t/2.
Therefore, i) and ii) hold for this case. Case (b),when t is
between u/2 and (3/4)u. i) πB U,I + π1U,I = 5u2/(16t) and πB,1C,P
= u-(2/3)t. 5u2/(16t) is smaller than u-(2/3)t if and only if
6− 6
6 + 6 , which approximates as 0.444u < t <
u<t<
u
8
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1.056u. Since u/2 ≤ t < (3/4)u, we can say that 5u2/(16t) is
smaller than u-(2/3)t for this range of t. ii) see (a)-ii. Therefore,
i) and ii) hold for this case.
Case (c), when t is between (3/4)u and u. i) πB U,I+ π1U,I
=5u 2/(16t) is smaller than πB,1U,P=3u2/(8t). ii) πB,1U,P +
π2U,P=7u 2/(16t) and πB,1,2C,F=u-t/2. 7u2/(16t) is smaller than
u-t/2 if and only if 4 − 2 u < t < 4 + 2 u , which approximates
4

4

as 0.646u < t < 1.354u. Since (3/4)u ≤ t < u, we can say that
7u2/(16t) is smaller than u-t/2 for this range of utility loss.
Therefore, i) and ii) hold for this case.
Case (d), when t ≥ u. i)we already showed this in the above
(c)-i). ii) πB,1U,P+ π2U,P = 7u2/(16t) is smaller than πB,1,2U,F =
u2/(2t). Therefore, i) and ii) hold for this case. From the four
cases (a), (b), (c), and (d), we conclude that πB I + π1I < πB,1P
and πB,1P + π2P < πB,1,2F. Hence, the equilibrium structure of
ownership is always full integration when the transaction costs
of mergers are negligible. <Q.E.D.>

Proof of Proposition 2'
All we need to show for this proposition is that the profit gain
of partial integration is not smaller than the profit gain of full
integration. For case (a), the gain of partial ni tegration is t / 12,
while the gain of full integration is t / 18. Therefore, the
proposition holds for this range of utility loss. For case (b), the
gain of partial integration isu - (2/3)t - 5u2/(16t), while the gain
of full integration ist / 18. The former is larger than the latter if
and only if 36 − 3 14 u < t < 36 + 3 14 u , which approximates as
52

52

0.476u<t<0.908u . Since u/2≤ t<(3/4)u, this inequality is true

We need to compare welfare under independent ownership
and welfare under partial integration. For case (a), so whent <
u/2, WFC,I = u-t/4 is larger than WFC,P = u-(5/18)t. For case
(b), so when u/2 ≤ t < (3/4)u, WFU,I = 7u2/(16t) and WFC,P =
u-(5/18)t. The former is smaller than the latter if and only if
36 − 3 74
36 + 3 74 , which approximates as 0.510u < t
u<t<
u
20

20

< 83.614u. Since we consider the utility loss between u/2 and
(3/4)u, we can say that WFU,I >WFC,P if u/2 ≤ t ≤ 0.510u, and
WFU,I <WFC,P if 0.510u < t < (3/4)u. For case (c) and case (d),
WFU,I = 7u2 / (16t) is smaller than WFU,P = 19u2/(32t).
Therefore we conclude that partial integration causes welfare
loss if t ≤ 0.510u, so if two supplemental goods are close
substitutes. If t > 0.510u, then partial integration is welfare
enhancing. <Q.E.D.>
Proof of Proposition 4
For case (a), it is trivial to show thatWFC,I = WFC,F > WFC,P
. For other cases, we need to show that the welfare under full
integration is the largest. For case (b), all we need to check is
whether WFU,I < WFC,F or not. This inequality holds if and only
if u/2 < t < (7/2)u. Since u/2 < t < (3/4)u, this is true for this
case. For case (c), since we showed thatWFU,I < WFU,P in the
previous proposition, we need to show that WFU,P < WFC,F.
This inequality holds if and only if 8 − 26 u < t < 8 + 26 u ,
4

4

which approximates 0.725u < t < 3.275u. This is true because
we are considering the case when (3/4)u < t < u. For case (d),
it is easy to show that WFU,I < WFU,P < WFU,F. From (b), (c),
and (d), we conclude that the full integration brings the highest
social welfare. <Q.E.D.>

